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NAVAL RESPONSE TO A CHANGED
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Maritime Security in the Mediterranean
Commander Alan Lee Boyer, U.S. Navy
EUCOM’s greatest contribution to security and stability lies as much in
preventing conflict as it does in prevailing on the battlefield.
GENERAL JAMES L. JONES
The capacity of the European Command to contribute to security and stabil-ity in its Mediterranean area of responsibility depends on its ability to de-
velop and execute operational concepts and capabilities that are appropriate to
the security environment in which it operates.1 In the maritime domain of the
Mediterranean, the threats are largely transnational in character and can be ef-
fectively dealt with only in cooperation with regional partners. The central chal-
lenge is not in locating and destroying enemy naval forces but in maintaining
good order at sea.2 Essentially, the task is to ensure access to the maritime com-
mons by all lawful actors and to inhibit the activities of illegal or hostile ones. If
European Command (EUCOM) and its partners are able to do that, the com-
mon interests of security and peaceful economic use of the Mediterranean Sea
will be advanced.
The key issue for EUCOM is: What concepts and type of forces should it pursue
in this connection? This question is best answered through the logic depicted in
figure 1.3 By following this logic, strategic and operational planners should be able
to assess where they are today and determine what type
of forces will be needed in the future. The first step con-
sists of two parts: assessing the security environment
and determining strategic objectives and requirements.
Requirements are derived from objectives and are
based on threats. Typically they come from official se-
curity strategies or policy statements. The next step is
to determine the nature of the strategic and operational
challenges that must be overcome. The planner can
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then go about how to deal with them. This is done by developing operational con-
cepts.4 The operational concept, in turn, gives rise to required capabilities, which
can, finally, be used to determine the forces or means the combatant commander
will need.
This article applies that methodology to the role of naval power in the Medi-
terranean over the next five to fifteen years. In doing so, it will address the fol-
lowing questions:
• What operational concepts should be developed to meet the operational
challenges of a security environment largely determined by transnational
threats and globalization?
• What capabilities do such concepts require the United States and its partners
to develop?
The goal of this paper is to come to grips with how to think about the process of
developing operational concepts for the use of naval power in the Mediterra-
nean area.
NATURE OF THE MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
The Mediterranean Basin is geographically, culturally, and politically diverse
(see table 1). At its center is the Mediterranean Sea itself, which connects the
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FIGURE 1
PLANNING METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS
Note: An expanded view of the third box in Owens, “Strategy and the Logic of Force
Planning,” fig. 2, “The Logic of Force Planning,” p. 490.
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Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea and Red Sea variously through the Strait of Gi-
braltar, the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and the Suez Canal. Along its northern
shore are several liberal democracies, of which Turkey is the region’s only secular
democracy with a Muslim majority. Its eastern shore is occupied by two liberal
democracies, Israel and Lebanon, and the authoritarian state of Syria. Several
authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states dominated by large Muslim popu-
lations occupy the Mediterranean’s southern shores.
The basin’s diversity and history have created two distinct approaches to deal-
ing with security challenges. Northern states generally take a cooperative-security
approach, creating a web of institutions, organizations, and frameworks—for
instance, NATO, the European Union (EU), Council of Europe, Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Barcelona Process (Euro-Med partner-
ship), 5+5 Dialogue, and Conference of Interior Ministers of the Western Medi-
terranean. Southern states, which generally distrust their neighbors, historically
have tended either to go it alone or form short-term alignments with
like-minded states. They have generally viewed cooperative-security forums and
arrangements with suspicion due to their strong focus on national sovereignty.5
However, over the last decade, as problems fueled by globalization have arisen,
intraregional political and security cooperation has increased on both sides of
the Mediterranean, especially through the Barcelona Process and NATO’s Medi-
terranean Dialogue.6
B O Y E R 7 5
Features Data
Countries (21)
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France,
Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Slovenia,
Spain, Serbia and Montenegro, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia, plus the Gaza Strip
Sea surface 965,000 sq. miles or 2,500,000 km2
Length (east–west) 2,500 miles or 4,000 km
Width (north–south) 500 miles or 800 km
Total length of coastline 27,963 miles or 45,000 km
Population of coastal nations (mid-2005) 461,300,000
Depth of water
Average 1,500 meters, deepest point 5,267 meters (about 3.27 miles) in
the Calypso Deep in the Ionian Sea
Urbanization of coastline 65 percent in 2000
Major straits Strait of Gibraltar, Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits, Suez Canal
Institutions involved in security NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, International Maritime Organization (IMO)
TABLE 1
PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
Source: United Nations Environmental Program, White Paper: Coastal Management in the Mediterranean (Split, Croatia: Priority Actions Programme, 2001), p.
7; Population Reference Bureau, 2005 World Population Data Sheet (Washington, D.C.: 2005), pp. 6–12.
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Economically, the Mediterranean Sea functions mainly as a resource and a
medium of transportation. As a resource, it provides food and supports local
economies through its fisheries and mineral resources in the seabed. Over forty
thousand boats fish the waters of the Mediterranean, harvesting around 500,000
tons annually.7 The primary minerals extracted are oil and natural gas, mostly
found off the shores of North African states, with smaller amounts near south-
ern Europe.8
The Mediterranean’s importance as a maritime highway has increased over
the last two decades due to globalization. Between 1990 and 2004, American,
European, and North African seaborne trade increased 71, 45, and 9 percent, re-
spectively. The quantity of crude oil and crude-oil products—which constitute
over 40 percent of world seaborne trade—increased by 42 percent during the
same period.9 Approximately 7.3 million barrels per day of oil (17 percent of
seaborne oil) transits the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, Sumed pipeline,
and Bosporus Strait.10 In addition to oil, large amounts of natural gas are moved
across the Mediterranean.11 According to the European Commission, nearly 90
percent of the external trade of the EU and 40 percent of its internal trade goes
by sea.12
The globalization of trade has not only driven up the volume of Mediterra-
nean seaborne transport but changed its nature. Mediterranean transport is no
longer primarily regional or even European; it is now an integral part of a trans-
national global maritime system. This development has decreased the cost of
7 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
MAP 1
MEDITERRANEAN REGION
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sea-based trade; dramatically increased the volume of goods moved by sea;13 fa-
cilitated a “just enough, just in time” operating philosophy;14 and dispersed the
ownership of the world’s merchant fleet away from major traders like the United
States.15
Past and Current Threats
Until the 1990s, the operational priority of the U.S. and Mediterranean navies
was finding and defeating hostile naval forces of other states. In World War II,
this involved everything from escorting merchant ships to sinking warships and
submarines. During the Cold War, missions evolved to locating, tracking, and
collecting intelligence on other naval forces, primarily those of the Soviet Union,
but they still focused on state actors and the threats they posed.
Since the end of the Cold War, the focus has been changed by globalization
and the demise of great-power competition among European states. These phe-
nomena have moved the security focus to threats emanating from weak states
and transnational actors. In March 2005, General James L. Jones, the EUCOM
commander, described the changed security environment in this way: “The new
security menace is transnational and characterized by enemies without terri-
tory, borders, or fixed bases. Threats include the export and franchising of ter-
rorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking,
uncontrolled refugee flow, illegal immigration and piracy on the seas.”16
While these transnational threats have, of course, existed for some time, the
changing structure of the international economic and political system has ren-
dered them more likely to affect adversely the security and the economic pros-
perity of the United States and Mediterranean nations.
Specific Maritime Security Threats and Challenges
Mediterranean maritime threats and challenges fall into four broad areas: terror-
ism, immigration and human trafficking, illicit trafficking in drugs and conven-
tional weapons, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Terrorism. Maritime terrorist attacks have been rare, especially in the Mediter-
ranean. Yet terrorists have been active in the region. Such groups as the Kurdish
PKK, Hezbollah, and Hamas have used the sea to channel funds and materiel for
operations in Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel and the Palestinian territories, respec-
tively. More recently, al-Qa‘ida has used the Mediterranean to support opera-
tions ashore and has planned attacks on ships in the Mediterranean.
In February and August 2001, al-Qa‘ida operatives were found by Italian au-
thorities aboard two Tonga-flagged vessels. In May and June 2002, Morocco cap-
tured three Saudi men—led by Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda
Al-Nasheri, Osama Bin Laden’s former chief of maritime operations—who were
actively plotting suicide attacks against U.S. and British warships in the Strait of
B O Y E R 7 7
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Gibraltar.17 According to intelligence officials, Al-Nasheri’s maritime strategy
had four major elements. The first was to use inflatable Zodiac-type speedboats
to attack ships. The second was to blow up medium-sized vessels near other
ships, including passenger liners if warships became too difficult to approach.
The third involved private planes (bought or stolen from flying clubs and small
airports) loaded with explosives. The last called for training underwater demoli-
tion teams to attack ships.18
An additional concern is that al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist groups might pro-
cure commercial vessels to carry legitimate cargo in order to raise money for their
operations. These vessels could ferry personnel, weapons, and information for
their organizations or other paying terrorist groups. Terrorists and other illegal
actors might also infiltrate the ranks of the world’s 1.2 million seafarers. Recent
International Maritime Organization (IMO) studies have shown that it is fairly
easy for unscrupulous persons to acquire forged or falsified seafarer certificates
and identity documents.19 Governments have traditionally granted relatively lib-
eral travel rights to seafarers through non-immigrant crew-list visas or simply
upon presentation of their documents, potentially affording terrorists a way to
bypass normal immigration and visitor controls.
Immigration and Human Trafficking. A major humanitarian, economic, and se-
curity challenge for the Mediterranean region is the movement of people. Every
year hundreds of millions pass through the region’s ports.20 Most are legal travel-
ers, but hundreds of thousands attempt to cross borders illegally. Italy estimates
that approximately seventy thousand illegal aliens enter across its sea borders an-
nually.21 Morocco arrested 28,500 illegal immigrants between January and No-
vember 2005, and Libya stopped over forty thousand that year. The majority
originate from sub-Saharan Africa, but they also come from Asia, the Maghreb,
Syria, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, and India. The major transit routes are across the
Strait of Gibraltar, especially through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta (a ninety-
minute ferry ride to the Spanish coast) and Melilla, from Libya and Tunisia (via
the island of Lampedusa and Malta to Italy), from the Canary Islands, from Alba-
nia and the Balkans (across the Adriatic to Italy, from Turkey toward Calabria and
Sicily), and across the Adriatic from Greece. Several thousand vessels smuggle
illegals across the Mediterranean each year.22 Many are overloaded or in poor con-
dition, resulting in hundreds of immigrant deaths every year.
Human trafficking is big business in the region. Those seeking illegal passage
reportedly pay between two and six thousand euros to cross the Mediterranean
from North Africa.23 Spanish authorities estimate that attempts to cross the Strait
of Gibraltar generate annual net turnover of thirty million euros.24 Transporters
range from small-time operators in the west to transnational criminal networks in
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the east. Terrorist organizations like the Kurdish PKK and al-Qa‘ida reportedly
engage in human trafficking to fund their primary operations.25
Illicit Trafficking in Drugs and Conventional Weapons. Migrants are not the only
illicit traffic in the region; also in play are drugs and conventional weapons.
Europe consumes approximately 33 percent of the world’s illicit drugs.26 Most of
its drugs transported by sea flow into southern Europe. Some, like cocaine, come
from as far away as Colombia. Cocaine shipments usually travel through Brazil
to the Canary Islands, where they are typically smuggled by Moroccan middle-
men into Spain. Other drugs, such as cannabis resin, originate mainly in Mo-
rocco. Heroin is customarily routed by sea from Asia through Turkey to Italy and
other parts of Europe.27 Drug trafficking, based on cases recorded, is one of the
most important activities of organized crime groups and networks in Europe; it
is a major criminal problem in Armenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany,
Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom.28
The Mediterranean also has a long history of trafficking in conventional
weapons and explosives. In recent years most of this activity has occurred in the
eastern Mediterranean, due to armed conflicts in the Balkans and the Palestinian
territories.29 Weapons traffickers include small freelancers as well as larger and
more sophisticated transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
Evidence of illicit weapons trading includes the April 2004 seizure by Italian po-
lice of a United States–bound Turkish-flagged ship carrying eight thousand
AK-47 rifles and the discovery by Turkish authorities of a Paraguay-bound con-
tainer holding five hundred AK-47s. Perhaps the largest case involved the
Comoros-flagged vessel Baltic Sky in June 2003. Acting on intelligence from
NATO, the Greek coast guard seized the Baltic Sky en route from Tunis to Sudan
and found undeclared cargo comprising 680 tons of industrial-grade explosives
and eight thousand detonators.30
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A major security objective for the
United States and its regional partners is nonproliferation. In the maritime do-
main, the problem has two dimensions. First, hostile nonstate actors may exploit
the sea to transport WMD for use against the United States and its allies.31 Second,
states and entities acting under state cover could use the sea to transport WMD
materials. A good example was the network run by Pakistani nuclear scientist
A. Q. Khan; it frequently used merchant vessels to transport WMD materials be-
tween states and other entities.32
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS
In addition to understanding the security environment, planners must identify
the strategic objectives and requirements they must pursue. The two sources of
B O Y E R 7 9
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strategic guidance for European Command planners are American and NATO
security strategies and policies. Consideration should also be given to the secu-
rity strategies of U.S. partners, in order to identify where they are consistent
with or conflict with U.S. and alliance documents.33
The primary unclassified American strategic documents relevant to naval
planners are the National Defense Strategy, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,
National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Maritime Security, and National
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.34 The key NATO policy documents
are the NATO Partnership Plan against Terrorism, NATO’s Military Concept for
Defense against Terrorism, Istanbul Summit Communiqué, the alliance’s Strategic
Concept, and the Expanded Framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue.35 The
EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) of 16
December 2002 and European Security Strategy of 12 December 2003 also pro-
vide valuable information on EU and NATO cooperation and security priorities.
American strategic requirements are threefold.* The first requirement is to
prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, criminals, or hostile
states to commit terrorist, criminal, or hostile acts against the United States, its
people, economy, property, territory, allies, or friends.36 Strengthening alliances
and partnerships is the second requirement.37 The third requirement is to de-
fend the United States forward—that is, to prevent enemies from attacking the
homeland by defeating them overseas.38
NATO requirements since 2001 have focused heavily on the threat of terror-
ism and WMD.39 Like the United States, NATO views the security environment
as changed and the main security threats as stemming from nonstate actors and
weak or failing states. A primary objective of the alliance is to detect and deter
terrorist activity and prevent the proliferation of WMD. A second objective is to
strengthen security and build stability through stronger relationships and co-
operation on security concerns that NATO shares with the EU, Russia, Ukraine,
the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and those of the Mediterranean and
broader Middle East.40 A major NATO goal for cooperation is to develop the ca-
pabilities of its partners to deal with security threats, whether in partnership
with NATO or by themselves. Improving interoperability and transforming ex-
isting military capabilities to meet the changing security environment is the alli-
ance’s final objective.†
Strategic guidance is important because it tells EUCOM planners what is im-
portant and in what priority. By matching the strategic guidance against an
8 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* U.S. strategic requirements are presented in more detail in table A-1, available in the online version
of this article.
† For additional detail on NATO requirements, see table A-2 in the online version of this article.
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assessment of the security environment, planners can determine the nature and
types of challenges they must overcome. Some of the challenges will be strategic,
others operational.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
Many of the maritime challenges facing EUCOM arise from the nature of the se-
curity environment in the Mediterranean. The first challenge is geography. The
Mediterranean Sea has twenty-eight thousand miles of coastline. Any effort to
try to control or regulate it has to deal with the reality of hundreds of points
from which vessels can get to sea.
The second challenge concerns the type of threats that must be combated. Es-
sentially there are two, threats to vessels on the sea and threats from the sea.
Though related, they require different responses. Protection of vessels at sea, due
to the globalization of maritime transport and trade system and the transna-
tional nature of the threat, is no longer just about protecting vessels flagged by
one’s own country. Because goods transported to a country are often not carried
by vessels flying that nation’s flag, major trading nations like the United States
must now be concerned about vessels under the flags of states like Panama, Ba-
hamas, Cyprus, and Liberia, with neither the means nor will to protect them.41
This means the challenge is about how to ensure that vessels vital to the global
economy and the prosperity of the United States can transit the maritime com-
mons without being harmed. Relatedly, it is about how the United States and its
partners can prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from using the sea to do
harm ashore or to fund their operations.
In both cases the maritime paths and means employed by criminals and ille-
gal immigrants are likely to be the same ones used by terrorists and WMD
proliferators, all these among the tens of thousands of ships navigating the waters
of the Mediterranean every year. Sorting through thousands of contacts to iden-
tify the handful engaged in harmful or illicit activities can be very problematic.42
The third challenge is political. The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by
twenty-one countries. Their national governments and numerous organiza-
tions, such as NATO, the EU, and IMO, deal with security in the Mediterranean.
Any effort to secure the maritime commons will involve multiple jurisdictions
and stakeholders. In this light, a central question arises: Are there common in-
terests sufficient to generate the political will that can bring cooperation and ac-
tion? Two common interests that might anchor a “maritime consortium” as a
basis for action are prosperity and security.43 Even if all parties agree to take such
action, however, there remains the challenge of developing a strategy that will
assure interoperability among numerous civilian and military security organi-
zations and national jurisdictions.
B O Y E R 8 1
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Interoperability is largely a political problem that manifests itself in rules of en-
gagement, legal structures, and resource allocations, but it also has an important
technical component.44 Any concept of operations that relies on cooperation to
deal with maritime threats in the Mediterranean must not only be able to generate
and sustain the political will to act but address the technological issues that follow.
As figure 2 shows, the technical impediments to interoperability are numer-
ous. The main challenge is how to create, with current and future technologies,
“situational awareness,” which in this connection is the ability to identify, pro-
cess, and comprehend critical elements of information in and around the mari-
time domain.45 Two elements are needed: a complete intelligence picture and a
real-time operational picture. Information, data-management, and communi-
cations systems support both. The problem is connecting the sources of informa-
tion to decision-support systems in ways that enable decision makers to deploy
8 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
• Technology gap between the United States and its partners
• Multiple communications systems and a lack of common IT
architecture accessible by the United States and partners
• Correlation of data from multiple sources and types of databases
(civilian, government agencies, military, and coast guards)
• Information systems that can be controlled, handled, or used with
ease by coalition partners
• Information systems unable to display or manage details on
vessels or their cargoes, crews, and passengers
• Displaying, tracking, and providing real-time information on
thousands of maritime contacts
• Decision-making tools able to distinguish abnormal, hostile, or
illegal activity from peaceful/lawful
• Information assurance that supports the sharing of information
across classified and unclassified systems
• Rapid communication of transit information between commercial
vessels and military, coast guard, and customs units
• Operational units without broadband systems or the bandwidth
needed to access the COP
• Response forces with the right technologies to respond rapidly
with the correct level of force.
FIGURE 2
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO CREATING INTEROPERABILITY
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operational forces against correct targets at the right time. In an ideal world, a
single database would contain all information on the maritime domain, and
a single communications system would give decision makers and operational
units access to a common operational picture (COP) and associated intelligence.46
For EUCOM and NATO to create such a network, connecting all twenty-one re-
gional nations, NATO, the EU, and numerous private-sector actors, may be a
“bridge too far,” for both political and technical reasons. If so, a less centralized
network will be needed that is capable of getting the right information to the
right decision makers in a timely manner. Either way, the technology used needs
to be interoperable across the entire spectrum of cooperation. This means it
must be able to connect information from commercial sources to police and na-
val forces at the national, regional, and international levels.
A subelement of the technological problem is classification and protection of
sensitive information. The United States and every other nation operating in the
Mediterranean uses classified display and information systems; many NATO
and other partners cannot access certain alliance or other national systems. So
the network to be created must operate at the unclassified level and protect sen-
sitive information.
Once the political and technological obstacles to a COP and complete intelli-
gence picture are solved, there remains the challenge of how to preempt or rap-
idly respond to threats at sea and from the littorals. One answer might be a larger
U.S. naval presence. However, much of the work will likely take place in territo-
rial waters (within twelve nautical miles of land). Even if coastal nations let
American or NATO units take initial action in their territorial waters, legal dis-
position of apprehended vessels and persons presents a problem. It requires le-
gal authority and a place to incarcerate persons and securely store seized
material. NATO, per se, does not have territory on the Mediterranean—its
members do; therefore, it must rely on the willingness of its members to act and
follow through—which is not always forthcoming.
The last challenge EUCOM must address is resources. European Command
and its partners operate in a resource-constrained environment. Defense spend-
ing in Europe is down, and the U.S. defense budget, while it has increased dra-
matically since 2000, is not likely to continue to rise.47 EUCOM, NATO, and EU
planners will have to find a way to use current assets more effectively and apply
future resources to the capabilities needed to support the operational concepts
they develop.
CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
European Command’s current operational concept for maritime security is to
use existing operations and security arrangements to improve cooperation in
B O Y E R 8 3
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order to combat terrorism and other illicit activities at or from sea, build the ca-
pacity of partners, and improve information sharing. By leveraging such secu-
rity frameworks as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean
Dialogue, and bilateral arrangements, EUCOM is attempting to build on past
cooperation and common interests.48
The main operation being used is Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE).
OAE was launched in October 2001 by NATO, under Article V of the Washing-
ton Treaty, as a part of its response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the
United States.49 OAE’s stated purpose was to detect, deter, and protect against
terrorist activity. Initially, ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR focused on naval presence and
surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea using naval forces as-
signed to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force
Atlantic.
In February 2003, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) expanded the operation
to include escorting merchant shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar.50 One of
the main reasons was to prevent further terrorist operations like the attack on
the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen on 6 October 2002. The
thirty-six-mile-long Strait of Gibraltar is vulnerable due to its narrowness and
the large volume of commercial traffic.51 Escort operations were suspended on
10 December 2003, recommenced on 29 January 2004, and were again sus-
pended on 29 May 2004.52
In April 2003, the NAC decided to expand OAE’s mandate to vessel queries
and compliant boardings.53 Typically, queries are conducted by aircraft and sur-
face units assigned to Joint Task Force ENDEAVOUR. All information gathered is
passed to the Maritime Component Command Headquarters in Naples
(CC-MAR Naples) and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, United King-
dom. If anything suspicious is learned, the vessel in question may be boarded
and inspected by NATO forces. Where there is intelligence or evidence of terrorist-
related activity, OAE forces are deployed to the area and readied for action,
which must be authorized by the NAC. During compliant boardings, if irregu-
larities unrelated to terrorism are found the information is passed to law en-
forcement authorities for action at the vessel’s next port of call. OAE forces
shadow the vessel until action is taken or it enters territorial waters on its way
into port. When a vessel refuses boarding, NATO works with national authorities
to see that it is inspected once it enters an alliance member’s territorial waters.54
On 16 March 2004, the NAC expanded OAE operations yet again to cover the
entire Mediterranean Sea, and in October NATO adopted a new operational pat-
tern. Since then, according the joint task force commander, Vice Admiral
Roberto Cesaretti,
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the focus has been on gathering and processing information and intelligence so as to
target specific vessels of interest. In this way, it is now possible to deploy surface
forces as reaction units to conduct specific tasks such as tracking and boarding of
vessels. The new operational pattern maintains a proactive posture. Moreover, re-
sources may be supplemented in periodic surge operations. At these times, augmen-
tation forces, such as one of the Standing Maritime Groups of the NATO Response
Force, join Task Force Endeavour to provide an enhanced presence and more inten-
sive surveillance capability.55
Based on this pattern of operations, OAE forces are utilized for the following
tasks: helping deter and disrupt any action supporting terrorism at or from the
sea; controlling choke points—the most important passages and harbors—by
deploying minehunters from Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Groups
to carry out preparatory route surveys; providing escorts through the Strait of
Gibraltar when necessary; and enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue and
other NATO programs to promote bilateral and multilateral relations.56
Typically around a dozen ships from NATO navies are assigned to Joint Task
Force ENDEAVOUR. This dedicated force gives NATO a visible presence at sea to
deter terrorism and other illicit activities in the sea lanes and to react to a broad
range of contingencies, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance,
and disaster relief.57 In addition, the operation also improves interoperability,
builds capacity, and generates cooperation and information sharing.
At the strategic level, NATO also uses ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR as a vehicle for po-
litical engagement with non-NATO states. The June 2004 NATO Summit in Is-
tanbul invited non-NATO countries (among them Russia, Ukraine, and
Mediterranean Dialogue countries) to participate in OAE. Since then, Russia,
Ukraine, Georgia, Israel, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Albania, Croatia, Sweden,
and Finland have expressed interest in joining the operation on some level.
Levels of participation include political discussions and intelligence sharing as
well as providing forces. Ukraine formally agreed to participate in OAE at the 21
April 2005 meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Vilnius.58 It will share
intelligence and send surface units to OAE and Strait of Gibraltar operations in
2007.59 Russian participation has consisted of the assignment of a liaison officer
to the Joint Informational Analysis Center (JIAC), at-sea training, and surface
patrols by the Black Sea Fleet frigate Pitlivy in September 2006. Russia has also
delegated to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet authority to approve compli-
ant boardings of Russian vessels by OAE forces. Georgia’s participation so far
has been limited to coordination and information sharing. The Albanian mili-
tary has committed itself to sharing of intelligence with NATO. Of the Mediter-
ranean Dialogue countries, Israel and Morocco have been the most active. In
February 2006, Israel agreed to share intelligence with NATO, send an officer to
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the JIAC, and provide logistical support by allowing OAE forces to make port
calls in Haifa without diplomatic clearance. It also finalized an Individual Co-
operation Program with NATO, under an enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue ar-
rangement, on 16 October 2006. Morocco has been sharing information with
NATO. Tunisia has established daily information sharing via secure fax between
its maritime operations center and CC-MAR Naples. Finally, at a 7 April 2006
meeting in Rabat between NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners, Algeria,
Israel, and Morocco agreed to join in naval counterterrorism patrols.
An OAE-affiliated undertaking, Operation BLACK SEA HARMONY (OBSH),
was launched on 1 March 2004 by the Turkish navy. The objective is to ensure
the “smooth flow of shipping through the Turkish straits as well as maintaining
navigational order along the vital sea lines of communication in the Black Sea
maritime domain” until a Black Sea Force is able to assume this and other mari-
time security duties on a permanent basis.60 Turkey is attempting to use OBSH
as a way to bring regional cooperation to the support of security and stability in
the Black Sea. Russia and Ukraine have formally announced their intentions to
participate.
OAE-OBSH cooperation consists of shadowing and trailing contacts of inter-
est and suspect ships, as well as information exchange—primarily via NATO
C4I* channels. In this way the United States is able to leverage its NATO relation-
ship with Turkey to obtain more information on Black Sea traffic before it ar-
rives in the Mediterranean. NATO also uses OBSH as another way to build
capacity within regional navies (in this case, those of Bulgaria, Romania, and
Ukraine).
Both the United States and NATO have been hoping to expand OAE into the
Black Sea since 2005. The United States officially requested that OAE’s mandate
cover the Black Sea on 23 February 2006. Two months later Washington reversed
its position and dropped the idea.61 Turkey has opposed such an expansion, fear-
ing it would threaten the 1936 Montreux Treaty, and has declared that existing
Black Sea naval structures are more than able to provide security in the region.62
Another significant government activity in the Mediterranean is the Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative (PSI). The focus of the PSI is to prevent the proliferation of
WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. So far, over sixty countries
have indicated support and over forty have participated in nineteen training exer-
cises.63 Between September 2003 and June 2006, six PSI maritime exercises took
place in the Mediterranean.64 PSI represents another way in which European
Command can generate practical cooperation and interoperability with NATO
and non-NATO partners in the Mediterranean.
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An international initiative by which EUCOM is attempting to improve its
maritime domain awareness is the International Maritime Organization’s Auto-
matic Identification Systems (AIS) initiative. Regulations adopted by the IMO
in 2000 required ships to carry AIS—a shipboard broadcast system, a continu-
ous and autonomous transponder, operating in the VHF maritime band.65 AIS
allows ships to track and identify each other and exchange pertinent navigation
information with one another or facilities ashore. Transmissions vary from two
seconds to six minutes depending on the ship’s speed and the type of data. AIS
information can be graphically displayed on a computer or overlaid onto a radar
display or electronic chart display and information system. Many coastal coun-
tries and commercial companies maintain shore-based AIS receivers to monitor
shipping traffic. Several commercial companies also provide access to
near-real-time AIS data over the Internet for an annual fee.66
By providing valuable information about routes, cargo, and ships themselves,
AIS can increase situational awareness, efficiency, and safety, and decrease the
burden of monitoring and controlling coastal and offshore waterways. Naval
forces and command centers can merge AIS into the common operational pic-
ture. Since 2006 European Command, with the assistance of the Department of
Transportation’s Volpe Center, has been testing ways to integrate AIS data and
other commercial data streams into American and NATO C4I systems. Recent
successes include live transmission of data from a cell phone in Egypt and the di-
rect feed of AIS data from a submarine under way.
The use of Automatic Identification Systems does not guarantee “visibility”
of all vessels; ships engaged in illicit activity can always turn their AIS off. Even if
all vessels keep their AIS on, there is no guarantee that their transmissions will
be picked up, for two reasons. First, AIS transponders transmit their informa-
tion in the VHF band, meaning that vessels well out to sea may not be in range of
a shore station; second, no international mandate requires countries to build
such stations, and there are not now enough to provide for 100 percent coverage.
Nevertheless, by comparing whatever AIS data is received to other sensor input,
maritime security forces can identify neutral and friendly contacts and elimi-
nate them from consideration, focusing on a smaller number of unidentified
contacts.
FUTURE EUCOM MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Any future operational concept for maritime security must make assumptions
and predictions on how future security trends and strategic requirements may
evolve. The best way to reduce uncertainty in this process is to examine how the
sea has been used in the past and is being used at present for human develop-
ment. As depicted in figure 3, there are five such means, or ways. By examining
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how society values each use, planners can make reasonable projections on the
capabilities required in the near and middle terms.
If society is to enjoy all five uses, someone must maintain good order at sea.
“Good order at sea requires a range of activities extending from law enforcement
at one end of the spectrum to the defense of security at the other.”67 Naval and
coast guard forces and civilian agencies all have responsibilities along this spec-
trum. The key challenge for naval planners and their partners is to determine
which should be conducted by naval forces and which by others.
Traditionally the fo-
cus for Western navies
has been the use of the
sea to advance political
power or dominion. The
sea has typically been
seen as a battleground in
the struggle for power
between states, or occa-
sionally nonstate enti-
ties. The business of
navies was to fight other
navies and carry out na-
val diplomacy;68 respon-
sibi l i ty for ensuring
good order for all other
purposes has been gen-
erally assigned to coast
guards and c iv i l i an
agencies. Historically
this outlook dominated
the creation of maritime operational concepts for Western navies, but since the
end of the Cold War and especially since 2001, operational concepts have
changed.69 Of the remaining uses of the sea, two—the sea as an environment and
a resource—have increased in importance over the last several decades.70 The
last use—the sea as a primary means of exchanging information and values be-
tween societies and nations—has decreased in importance, and its influence will
be more indirect than in the past, due to the advent of inexpensive air travel, tele-
vision, satellite communications, large undersea cable networks, and
cyberspace.71
Recent maritime operations in the Mediterranean have reflected the changing
order of importance in the five uses of the sea. As a result, EUCOM’s maritime
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FIGURE 3
GOOD ORDER AT SEA
Note: How the sea has been and is now used to advance human development. Threats to the use of the sea for ex-
changing information not listed; they would include anything that impedes the passage of vessels. Adapted from
figure 10.3 in Till, Seapower, p. 310.
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concept of operations has been changing. In the next decade it is likely that a new
operational concept will emerge, one built on three pillars. The first pillar, leverag-
ing existing security frameworks to build cooperation and capacity, will be a con-
tinuation of the current concept. NATO will continue to be central to this pillar,
and a further maturing of cooperation between NATO, the European Union, and
other partners can be expected.
Pillar two—creating maritime domain awareness, or MDA, in a coalition
environment—will be at the heart of any new concept of operations. MDA is the
effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that
could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the nation.72 It
creates the situational awareness needed to allow the United States, its allies, and
its partners to take early actions against hostile actors and guarantee access to
the maritime commons.
The third pillar, the ability to preempt and respond rapidly to threats at sea
and from the littorals, is enabled by the first two: cooperation and MDA together
create the ability to deter, preempt, interdict, and respond to maritime threats.
Some of this capacity will reside in American units, but the majority will have to
come from regional navies, coast guards, customs services, and other national
security services.73 As we have seen, a larger U.S. naval presence in the Mediterra-
nean region will not, of itself, dramatically improve the ability of the United
States or the alliance to preempt, interdict, or respond to maritime threats, be-
cause most of the work would take place in territorial waters. European Com-
mand’s capacity to respond will therefore depend on its own ability to conduct
combined operations and on the capabilities of its partners.
If this concept (figure 4) is to work, several things need to happen. First, co-
operation and information sharing between Mediterranean nations, private
shipping companies, port authorities, NATO, EU, EUCOM, and international
institutions and agencies will have to become routine, the normal way of doing
business. The military task of collecting knowledge about maritime activity, es-
tablishing a baseline upon the basis of which intelligence can be analyzed and
unusual activity be revealed, can be completed only in close cooperation with
the commercial sector.74
Second, the United States, either the European Command or working in the
NATO framework, will need to take the lead in creating a multinational inter-
agency network that links all the elements, from sensors to decision makers to
operational forces. Central to this process will be improving the effectiveness of
the Joint Information Analysis Center in Naples.75 JIAC will need to capitalize
upon initiatives like the Italian navy’s Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Cen-
tre;76 it must also connect with regional military command centers and such
nonmilitary entities as the Western Sea Border Centre, Eastern Mediterranean
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Sea Borders Centre, and
the European Union’s
FRONTEX. 7 7 So far,
JIAC’s ability to collate
and analyze data and
disseminate it as action-
able intelligence has not
met expectations, largely
as a result of a lack of fo-
cus on the maritime do-
main and small maritime
analysis capability.78
Third, the concept
should not solely focus
on terrorism. The sea is a
medium for transport
and, inevitably, numer-
ous illicit activities. Of-
ten the means and paths
traveled by criminals and illegal immigrants are used also by terrorists and WMD
proliferators. It can be hard from a distance to distinguish one illicit activity from
another. Making good order at sea—that is, the elimination of illicit activity—the
objective of the concept is likely to produce better results and may be the best way
to guarantee long-term political buy-in by Mediterranean states.79
Fourth, the concept needs to develop technological and political means to
generate complete operational and intelligence pictures. The system will have to
operate at the unclassified level but use secure links, processing large volumes of
information and passing it quickly to a large number of users. Traditional classi-
fied systems are not a viable option; classified information is not actionable in
the multinational and interagency environment. Whether the network uses
commercial encryption methods, Internet protocols, or some other technology,
it must be affordable, reliable, easy to use, and widely accessible, and it must pro-
vide enough security to allow confidence in the data it contains. The United
States and other nations will still have and use their own classified systems, but
the network that enables MDA cannot be based solely on them. How well its pro-
tocols and procedures handle sensitive and classified information will be critical
to success.
Lastly, political understandings and legal authorizations need to be in place at
the international, regional, and national levels. The situational awareness of-
fered by MDA is of no value if executives lack legal authority or organizational
9 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
FIGURE 4
CURRENT AND FUTURE MARITIME SECURITY
OPERATING CONCEPTS
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arrangements to take action. Operationally, this means military and civilian
forces must be free to cooperate across jurisdictions without constant requests
for permission. Considerable progress has been made over the last few years, but
much more work needs to be done.80
Required Capabilities and Attributes
Future American and allied forces will need a wide range of capabilities to im-
plement such a maritime security operational concept.81 These capabilities must
lead to unity of effort between U.S. forces and their partners and to a focus on
good order at sea. They fall into four areas. The first is cooperation and integration
between U.S. forces and their military and civilian partners. Knowledge of capa-
bilities, political restrictions, and legal authorities is the second capability area.
Generating actionable intelligence through MDA is the third.82 Within it are
eleven subordinate capabilities:
• “Long-dwell-time” surveillance of major choke points, high-traffic zones,
and areas of interest
• Detection and monitoring of a large number of vessels, people, cargoes,
and activity at sea and in port, in real or near-real time
• Integration of JIAC with other regional maritime command and coordination
centers and development of a maritime analysis capability at the JIAC
• Information connectivity to decision makers and operating forces in a
multinational and interagency environment
• Analysis and decision-making tools to sort abnormal from normal activity
(e.g., unclassified data mining and anomaly detection)
• Wide-area telecommunications
• Common database sharing
• Fusion of the intelligence picture with the common operational picture
• Accessibility of the COP to all partners (civilian and military)
• Display and integration of commercial AIS data in the COP
• Real-time access by boarding teams to biometric and other databases
allowing them to identify terrorist and criminal suspects immediately
(implying an ability to collect biometric information).83
The last capability needed to support a maritime security operational con-
cept as envisioned here is deterrence, preemption, and interdiction of, and re-
sponse to, illicit activity at sea and in the littorals. This point too has subordinate
capabilities. The first is the ability to deploy force packages tailored to specific
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threats (right type and amount of force at right time). To this end operational
forces need to be fast, scalable, networked, and interoperable. Interoperability
between U.S. naval forces and the NATO Response Force is a subcapability in it-
self, as would be a NATO Response Force capable of operations at sea ranging
from law enforcement–related actions, such as boardings, to more traditional
combat missions. Response forces generally must be able to respond to threats in
the littorals, close to shore, in straits, pierside or at anchor, and, as noted, must be
able to receive and transmit biometric data.
These capabilities and their component tasks constitute a framework upon
which planners can determine what they will need to combat maritime threats
in the Mediterranean. Force structures may vary, but all will have to be net-
worked, interoperable, and adaptable.84
Risks and Uncertainty
No operational concept can be complete without addressing risk and uncer-
tainty. Clearly, no one can predict the future with complete accuracy.85 However,
the central challenge of ensuring good order at sea will remain. The tools that
globalization provides transnational actors will continue to challenge states. Ac-
cordingly, the number of different paths that events will take over the next five to
fifteen years is limited. The real uncertainty lies not in what will need to be done
but in the ability of the United States to create a maritime coalition capable of
dealing with what the future brings.
So the question is: Can the United States, specifically European Command,
create a coalition with the right capabilities to deal with maritime threats to
American and allied interests? The answer depends on how well EUCOM under-
stands the limitations of the United States and of its partners and how well it
mitigates risk. The cooperation needed to build domain awareness and the ca-
pacity to respond to threats in a multinational environment are difficult to cre-
ate. Any concept of operations that relies on multiple partners to deliver on their
promises is bound to be problematic, for reasons ranging from a lack of political
will to a lack of resources on the part of any player, including the United States.
Local corruption, bureaucratic inefficiencies, friction, chance, differing inter-
ests, and the difficulty of keeping track of constantly moving vessels, cargoes,
and people at sea also threaten the ability to execute the concept.86
The risk can be reduced and chances of success improved by a combination of
strategies. First, the concept should not have an “American face”: U.S. planners
should support NATO, allied, and private initiatives whenever possible. Second,
priority for resources should go to assets that will enable others to succeed and
to capabilities partners cannot develop themselves—for instance, bandwidth
needed to connect a regional MDA network, software to manage and
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disseminate (without cost to users) a common operational picture, AIS stations,
and certain operational expenses of partners. Third, surveillance and tracking
should focus on contacts of interest and anomalies, not attempt to follow every
vessel under way in the Mediterranean; normal behavior and lists of trusted ves-
sels can filter out vessels that need not be watched. Fourth, international and re-
gional maritime initiatives (like AIS and the Marine Electronic Highway
program) that create greater transparency in the maritime domain and promote
cooperation between commercial and government sectors should be encour-
aged and supported.87 Lastly, the decision-making process in planning and exe-
cution should be open, including partners at all levels and stages and respecting
their interests and sensitivities.
Today’s security environment presents many challenges for U.S. combatant
commands. To overcome them these commands must craft and execute opera-
tional concepts that align strategic requirements with resources. In the maritime
domain, their concepts should produce forces and procedures flexible enough to
respond to changes in how the sea is used for human development. Naval plan-
ners need to develop a broader perspective of maritime activities; all are interre-
lated. They also need to remember that naval forces are a means to an end—to
advance American interests. In the Mediterranean, this means maintaining
good order at sea in order to ensure economic prosperity and defense of the
United States and its regional allies against those who threaten them. This task is
not one the United States can accomplish on its own.88 NATO, regional states,
commercial enterprises, and other regional and international entities all have
roles to play.
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terrorist patrols in the Mediterranean spotted
suspicious movement on the M/V Crystal and
began tracking the vessel. They notified the
Hellenic Coast Guard, which intercepted the
vessel as it approached Greek waters. Greek
authorities boarded the vessel and subse-
quently arrested the captain, crew, and 126 il-
legal immigrants.
58. In December 2005, NATO officials visited
Sevastopol to discuss Ukrainian fleet prepara-
tions for participation in OAE. On 27 January
2006, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko
signed a decree approving the Vilnius agree-
ment, which will allow Ukrainian forces to
participate in OAE.
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EURASIA Daily Monitor, 3 March 2006,
available at www.jamestown.org/.
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vessels through the Bosporus and Darda-
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State for European and Eurasian Affairs,
stated on 29 March 2006 that even though
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the Black Sea region, it has no intention of vi-
olating the convention.
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pacity all states able and willing to take steps
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tember 2003, available at www.state.gov/t/np/
rls/fs/23764.htm; “Exercises,” Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative, www.proliferationsecurity
.info/exercises.html.
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for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) states
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speed, navigational status, and other safety-
related information—automatically to appro-
priately equipped shore stations, other ships,
and aircraft; receive automatically such infor-
mation from similarly fitted ships; monitor
and track ships; and exchange data with
shore-based facilities. All vessels built after 1
July 2002 and those built before then that are
engaged in international voyages, with the
exception of ships less than three hundred
gross tons (other than passenger vessels and
tankers), are required to carry AIS. Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, “AIS Tran-
sponders,” www.imo.org/Safety/.
66. For example, AISLive provides this service for
$1,320 per user per year. The five-user license
costs $2,275.
67. Till, Seapower, p. 342.
68. This does not mean navies did not conduct
other actions, like patrolling fisheries and inter-
cepting drug smugglers, only that such mis-
sions have not shaped naval strategy and
operational concepts.
69. The rise of a near-peer competitor could
bring dominion once again to the forefront of
naval planning, but most experts do not see
the rise of a military peer competitor in the
Mediterranean any time soon. Douglas E.
Streusand, “Geopolitics versus Globaliza-
tion,” in Globalization and Maritime Power,
ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington, D.C.: Na-
tional Defense Univ. Press, 2002), pp. 49–53.
70. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean
Blueprint for the 21st Century (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004),
pp. 1–16, 384; Till, Seapower, pp. 311–14.
71. The function of the sea as a means of ex-
changing information and values has largely
been overtaken by the globalization of mod-
ern information technology and aviation
transportation systems. Cyberspace is now
the dominant medium of global communica-
tions. See Till, Seapower, p. 353; James J.
Wirtz, “Will Globalization Sink the Navy?” in
Globalization and Maritime Power, ed.
Tangredi, p. 556.
72. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain
Awareness (Washington, D.C.: White House,
2005), p. 1.
73. As of late 2006 the U.S. Navy had only two
ships permanently stationed in the Mediterra-
nean, a command ship and a tender; all other
U.S. naval combatants in the Mediterranean
deploy there from elsewhere. Typically at least
one ship is assigned to Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean. Often naval forces deployed to
the Mediterranean are redeployed to other
theaters, especially the Arabian Gulf. Typically,
the only time aircraft carriers spend in the Med-
iterranean is in transit to the Arabian Gulf.
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74. Vice Admiral Timothy P. McClement, OBE,
“The Asymmetric Threat in the Maritime
Environment—a Military Perspective,” pre-
sentation to the Fifth Regional Seapower Sym-
posium, 14 October 2004, available at www
.marina.difesa.it/symposium/programma14
.htm.
75. The purpose of the JIAC is the active promo-
tion of common information collection and
reporting and coordination. Cesaretti, “Com-
bating Terrorism in the Mediterranean.”
76. According to Admiral Sergio Biraghi, the
chief of staff of the Italian navy, the purpose
of the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Cen-
tre (V-RMTC) is to increase coordination of
maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean.
V-RMTC is intended to provide naval forces
with information on traffic in the Mediterra-
nean in real time, by secure Internet links. As
of late 2006, twenty-six navies were participat-
ing in the project. Assembly of the Western
European Union, “The Assembly Advocates
the Use of Naval Defence Forces in Missions
That Are Not Strictly Military in Character,”
WEU press release, 7 December 2005, avail-
able at www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/presse/cp/
2005/44.html. See also www.marina.difesa.it/
vrmtc/en/vrmtc.htm.
77. The Western Sea Borders Centre (WSBC) in
Madrid, Spain, is responsible for surveillance
of the Baltic and western Mediterranean. The
Eastern Sea Borders Centre (ESBC) in Piraeus,
Greece, is responsible for the eastern Mediter-
ranean. FRONTEX (European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at
the External Borders of the Member States of
the European Union) became operational on
1 May 2005. Its purpose is to coordinate
among and assist the competent services of
the member states responsible for imple-
menting the Schengen acquis on control of
persons at the external borders. Its tasks in-
clude coordinating operational cooperation
between member states in the field of man-
agement of external borders (land and sea);
cooperation is envisaged with Europol, inter-
national organizations, and third countries.
Interparliamentary European Security and
Defense Assembly, Surveillance of the Mari-
time and Coastal Areas of European States,
Document A/1920 (Paris: Assembly of West-
ern European Union, 6 December 2005),
pp. 8–9.
78. Operational effectiveness in maritime areas
largely depends on having the right personnel
in place at the JIAC. The JIAC has done a
much better job of collating, analyzing, and
disseminating data as actionable intelligence
for Balkan, Afghanistan, and other primarily
land operations.
79. Most Mediterranean navies view terrorism as
a threat, but more often than not they see the
threat in the much broader context of illicit
activity in general. See presentations by Gen-
eral Mohand Tahar Yala (commander of Al-
gerian naval forces), Rear Admiral Abdelaziz
Aichouche (Royal Moroccan Navy), Rear Ad-
miral Mohamed Kamel Bouhaouala (Tunisian
navy), and several of the other presenters at the
Fifth Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice,
Italy, on 14 October 2004, available at www
.marina.difesa.it/symposium/programma14
.htm.
80. Examples of the progress in this area include
the 2005 amendments to the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts at Sea Convention, con-
sensual boarding agreements with flag-of-
convenience countries like Panama as part
of the PSI, and the signing of numerous
memorandums of understanding on shar-
ing classified information among the
United States, NATO, and most of the
states that border the Mediterranean.
81. A capability is “the ability to achieve desired
operating effects under specified standards
and conditions through combinations of
means and ways to perform a set of tasks.”
Ryan Henry, “Defense Transformation and
the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review,” Pa-
rameters (Winter 2005/06), p. 12.
82. Capability 3 (develop and maintain shared
situational awareness and understanding) in
section 5 of the Command and Control Joint
Integrating Concept contains a more detailed
discussion on this capability. U.S. Defense
Dept., Command and Control Joint Integrating
Concept (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2005),
pp. 23–24.
83. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain
Awareness, p. 16.
84. Examples of this process and a more detailed
discussion of many of the above capabilities
can be found in the National Strategy for
Maritime Security, U.S. Navy’s FORCENet
Functional Concept, Command and Control
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Joint Integrating Concept, and Command and
Control Joint Functional Concept. All joint
concepts are available at www.dtic.mil/
futurejointwarfare/index.html#, and FORCENet
Functional Concept at forcenet.navy.mil/
concepts/fn-concept-final.pdf.
85. Colin Gray, “How Has War Changed since
the End of the Cold War?” Parameters (Spring
2005), p. 16.
86. Friction “is the force that makes the appar-
ently easy so difficult.” Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1976), p. 121.
87. A marine electronic highway (MEH) is a sys-
tem of technology, people, and processes that
enables third-party access to marine environ-
mental and operational data and information
in real or near-real time. It embodies tools to
record, store, manage, model, analyze, and
access oceanographic and other data and to
present the results as textual and graphical in-
formation to a broad base of expert and
nonexpert users. The first MEH demonstra-
tion project (2004–2008) is being conducted
in the Straits of Malacca by the IMO, Singa-
pore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, funded by the
World Bank’s Global Environmental Faculty.
Randy Gillespie, “Global Marine Electronic
Highway: Proposed Vision and Architecture,”
Canadian GeoProject Centre, available at
www.acops.org/Gillespie.pdf.
88. U.S. Defense Dept., The National Defense
Strategy of the United States, p. 19.
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